Excise Tax Harmonisation in Australia at Federation

Constitutional changes at the time of Federation in Australia required the harmonisation of the excise tax rates of the former Colonies. This paper outlines the excise tax systems of the Colonies before Federation and that of the Commonwealth after Federation. Estimates are made of the consumer tax equivalent rates and of the implicit rates of protection in each Colony and in the Commonwealth after Federation. The Commonwealth Government harmonised the excise tax rates of the Colonies at about the mid‐points of the rates of the Colonies but the implicit rates of protection increased after Federation.     

金融腐败与被监管者自我报告制度研究

金融腐败与金融监管有着重要联系,而且在金融监管及惩处的执法过程中会存在着监管腐败问题。文章在金融监管执法活动中构建了一个具有腐败倾向特征的监管执法者对金融机构或其从业人员的违法行为监督执法的模型,指出一个福利最大化的政府可以通过实施适当的激励政策以防范监管者和被监管者之间合谋腐败的发生,同时证明了如果允许金融活动参与者在违法行为发生后可以实施具有恰当的惩罚激励措施的自我报告制度,政府就能够通过降低官僚作风、保持较少的监督执法官员、降低监管寻租以增加社会福利,并通过自我报告制度消除金融腐败而进一步为社会谋福祉。     

高管激励、非效率投资与公司业绩

从代理理论出发,以2001--2010年A股上市公司的数据为研究样本检验高管激励方式、非效率投资与公司业绩之间关系,研究结果表明：显性激励和隐性激励对于投资效率和公司业绩的影响是不同的,显性激励能够通过提升投资效率来改善公司业绩,而隐性激励则没有这样的作用;在不同所有制样本中,隐性激励对国有企业影响更大,而显性激励对非国有企业影响更大。     

Performance budgeting: effects on government debt and economic growth

This article examines the effects of performance budgeting on government debt and economic growth rates. The results show that countries with a higher share of ministries using performance targets in budget negotiation tend to have lower government debt and higher GDP growth rates. A simple fixed-effect model shows similar results. The evidence suggests that these results hold only in those countries with relatively lower corruption.     

网络舆论监督与中国行政腐败的预防治理

当前互联网在舆情反映和舆论监督方面开始实质性地发挥作用,在应对行政腐败的层面,体现出确保反腐独立、克服地方保护和升级民主法治三个特征。网络舆论监督对行政腐败的预防与治理发挥着积极的作用,但网络舆论监督也有它的缺陷,诸如网络信息的准确性无法核实和情绪性言论泛滥等较为突出的问题,都需要政府部门加强应对的主动性,最大化地发挥网络的积极功效。     

国有企业腐败预警指标体系构建

近几年来,国企腐败现象愈演愈烈,已成为人们关注的焦点。本文根据国企腐败的表现和特点,以目前广泛应用的反腐败指标为基础,有针对性地筛选、改造了12组指标,构建了一套完整的国有企业腐败预警指标体系,为国有企业的反腐败工作提供了新的方法和思路。     

Corruption and market attractiveness influences on different types of FDI

Previous studies have proposed that a compensatory model predicts the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) in a country; FDI levels are a result of ‘trade‐offs’ between the positive effect of market attractiveness and the negative influence of corruption. In contrast, we hypothesize and find that the compensatory relationship only holds for market‐seeking investment; for resource‐seeking FDI the model appears to be noncompensatory. Greater market attractiveness mitigates the negative impact of corruption on market‐seeking investment, but the ability of market attractiveness to mitigate the negative impact of corruption on resource‐seeking FDI quickly disappears as corruption levels increase. Implications and future research directions are discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Law environment,government regulation and implicit contract: Empirical evidence from the scandals of China’s listed companies

In China’s transitional economy, government regulation could be a substitute for the lack of law mechanism and regulator’s power could spill over into other areas not regulated. Then, theoretically it could construct implicit contracts. For example, China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has the rights to choose initial public offering(IPO) firms among applicants. It might construct implicit contracts between CSRC and local governments if the former consider the frequency and the severity of the scandals among different areas. Local governments could make decisions on whether and how much to implement the implicit contracts.     

International Bribery: Does a Written Code of Ethics Make a Difference in Perceptions of Business Professionals

This article analyzes the attitudes of United States business professionals toward the issue of international bribery, and in particular, whether or not having a written code of ethics has an effect on these attitudes. A vignette relating to international bribery from a widely used survey instrument was employed in a nationwide survey of business professionals to gather information on ethical attitudes of respondents. Data were also collected on gender of respondents, whether or not respondents were self-employed, whether or not the respondents’ firms had a written code of ethics, and to what extent the respondents’ firms generated revenues from international operations. Attitudes concerning whether or not international bribery is ever acceptable exhibited wide dispersion. Respondents from firms that have a written code of ethics were significantly less likely to find international bribery acceptable. Firms that generate revenues from international operations were significantly more likely to have a written code of ethics than were firms which did not generate revenues from international operations. Implications of the findings for business policy are discussed. Joseph A. McKinney is Ben H. Williams Professor of International Economics at Baylor University. He was previously on the faculty of the University of Virginia, and has served as visiting professor to universities in Japan, France, the United Kingdom and Canada. His research interests include business ethics, international trade policy, and regional economic integration. Carlos W. Moore is the Edwin W. Streetman Professor of Marketing at Baylor University, where he has been on the faculty for more than 30 years. His research interests include business ethics, marketing and advertising evaluation, and small business strategies. He has done consulting on bank marketing and new product development.